The short answerRadiant has been drained twice, most severely in October 2024 when attackers compromised the devices of multiple multisig signers and pushed through a malicious upgrade worth roughly $50m. The contracts were not the weak point — the keys were, and recovery has been partial at best.
Best forCross-chain lending, with serious caveats
Collateral & liquidation policyweight 25%
5.0avg 7.7
Oracle designweight 20%
5.5avg 7.6
Loss recordweight 20%
2.5avg 7.4
Rate qualityweight 15%
6.0avg 7.7
Governance & transparencyweight 10%
4.5avg 7.2
Coverageweight 10%
7.0avg 7.1
this service category average across 15Score = Σ mark × weight. We would not put our own funds through it. Methodology.
| Criterion | Mark | What we found | Source | Checked |
|---|
| Collateral & liquidation policy | 5.0 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
| Oracle design | 5.5 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
| Loss record | 2.5 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
| Rate quality | 6.0 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
| Governance & transparency | 4.5 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
| Coverage | 7.0 | not sourced yet | not sourced yet | — |
What we liked, and what fell short
Liked- Genuine cross-chain lending via LayerZero messaging
- Attempted transparent communication during the incidents
Fell short- October 2024 multisig compromise cost roughly $50m
- An earlier 2024 flash-loan exploit had already drained around $4.5m
Why the marks landed where they did
Radiant's cross-chain lending design was ambitious: borrow on one chain against collateral on another, using LayerZero messaging. What ended it was not the ambition but basic key security.
The October 2024 compromise
Attackers compromised the devices of several multisig signers and presented them with transactions that appeared routine while executing a malicious contract upgrade. Multiple signers approved. Roughly $50m was drained. It is the same class of attack that hit Bybit months later: valid signatures authorising a transaction the signers did not understand.
The earlier exploit
In January 2024 a flash-loan attack exploited a rounding issue in a newly deployed market, costing around $4.5m. Two significant incidents in one year, from different causes, is a pattern rather than bad luck.
What it means for depositors
A protocol whose upgrade keys were compromised can be upgraded again. Recovery has been partial, the DAO's capacity to compensate is limited, and there is no version of this risk assessment where depositing here is sensible while comparable protocols with clean records exist on the same chains.
Who should use it
Nobody, on our assessment. The functionality Radiant offers is available at Aave, Morpho or Fluid without the incident history.
FAQ
What happened to Radiant Capital?+
In October 2024 attackers compromised multiple multisig signers' devices and pushed through a malicious upgrade, draining roughly $50m. An earlier flash-loan exploit in January 2024 cost around $4.5m.
Were users compensated?+
Recovery has been partial at best, with limited DAO capacity to make depositors whole.
Is Radiant safe to use now?+
We would not deposit. A protocol whose upgrade keys were compromised can be compromised again, and equivalent functionality is available elsewhere with clean records.
What was the multisig attack?+
Signers' devices were compromised so that the transaction displayed for approval differed from the one actually signed — the same class of attack that later hit Bybit.
